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This paper assesses two instruments of power: the miranda and credenda of 
power. These instruments can be found in different power systems and re-
gimes: in ancient Greece, Islamic medieval states or even in Modern Middle 
Easter states. The first approach is historical, which helps to understand the 
origin of the miranda and credenda of power. The second approach is theo-
retical, which helps to show both the miranda and credenda of power that are 
used to assess the claims to the justification of power. As a critique, this paper 
shows that semi-democracies, fascist states, theocracies, and communist re-
gimes use these instruments excessively to justify their power. Abuse of such 
instrument is only possible by generating “negative political consciousness” of 
which aim is to make folks to become rightless and powerless. Such trend is a 
threat to a healthy democracy. The aim of this paper attempts to show the 
important role of miranda and credenda of power in justification of power. 
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1. Conceptualization of the Politics of Miranda and  
Credenda in Ancient Greek and Farabi’s Theory 
The most perplexing system of authoritarian/totalitarian power relies on Divine 
Law and Natural Law. More interestingly, in the medieval period, as well as in 
recent times, even common local religious leaders challenged the ongoing au-
thority of their time in order to establish a new power structure.1 We can see that 
 
 
1Due to the broad concept of this debate, I follow the transition of thought from ancient Greek to 
Farabi, the most prominent political theorist of medieval Islamic period. 
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the result of most revolutions in the religious societies—especially in the Middle 
East—was different forms of theocracies. At least, this was the first step to estab-
lish authoritarian/totalitarian power structures. One argument in the favor of 
such transitions is Aristotle’s theory of mixed government or semi-democracy, 
in which authoritarian/totalitarian power structures are considered to depend on 
a limited number of virtuous men (Barker, 1959: p. 112 [1]). Aristotle to some 
extent tried to argue for the right to participate in power. He argued not only in 
the case of Plato’s philosopher-king, but also for some free men who were ad-
mired for their arbitrary virtues. Such a change between the thoughts of Plato 
and Aristotle in terms of the distribution of power demonstrated some form of 
rational-normative politicization which helped to move from an absolute autho-
ritarian/totalitarian regime toward a hybrid one (Aristotle, Pol. III [2]; Svolik, 
2012 [3]). 
Admittedly, sometimes the study of the history of each state, its region and its 
prevailing tradition and political discourses can explain its criterion or concept 
of excellence more than looking at the process of rational patterns of politiciza-
tion. For example, the communist takeover of 1949 in China or Islamist takeover  
after the so called “Arab Spring”2 in the Middle East are not the revolution 
caused by—our theory of—the political consciousness but some form of move-
ment which heavily affected by a continuation of the imperial or religious auto-
cratic traditions (see Fu, 1993 [4]). 
Researchers involved in forming collective opinions, judgments, and political 
decisions (Ariely, 2008 [5]; Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000 [6]) have asserted that deci-
sions made by human beings, especially authorities, in the process of politiciza-
tion are heavily based on heuristics and are susceptible to memory biases that 
limit the amount of information and experience that they are able to use (Schac-
ter & Addis, 2007: pp. 773-786 [7]). Hence, after the governance of an absolute 
authoritarian/totalitarian regime, a healthy democracy is less likely than other 
forms of oligarchic and theocratic regimes, since the biases such as the use of 
ideology for political control, concentration of power in the hands of a few, 
states power over all aspects of life, religion and law as the tools wielded by the 
rule, and the subjection of the individual to the state still exist in the political 
tradition of the region (Foucault, 1998: p. 92 [8]). Yet, we ask how we can find a 
politically understandable pattern of power transition? 
The process of transition to other power structures is slow and fragile, but 
revolutions and regime changes may be quick. We must differentiate between 
these two in order to understand that those people who come from the lower 
classes, often discriminated against, use different opportunity, whether in eco-
nomic or political crisis, to claim power against the highest class. When the 
process of transition to other power is not compatible with the process of politi-
cization, the result will be the political disaster.  
 
 
2The revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests occurring in the Middle East and in North 
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The justification of these claims to power can be based either on traditional 
power relations, virtuous elements, religion or belief (Taylor, 1994: p. 54 [9]; 
Taylor, 1985: 183-229 [10]), rational merits, or even on all of these sources 
(Hayek, 1944: p. 135 [11]). The miranda is the traditional way of justification of 
power. An authority based on the miranda of power claims to power based on 
different forms of admiration. Different form of gods, in the beginning, and the 
patriarchal regime, later, are examples of power structures in which miranda of 
power has been exercised for centuries. 
In the beginning of history of states, powers were gods and the sons of the 
gods. A primitive process of politicization changed power of gods and the sons 
of gods from an unknown and metaphysical authority to a perceptible worldly 
concept of authority. This was a turning point from an insecurity to a respect to 
the concept of creation and protection. Power emanated in the face of fathers 
(Filmer, 1980: ch. 1:8 [12]; Filmer, 1980: ch. 1:1 [12]), mothers and uncles. Pa-
triarchal and matriarchal positions were the source of justification of power in 
different personalities and offices (Filmer, 1980: ch. 1:1 [12]). Traditionally, the 
most common reason for obedience to such powers was no reason at all (Mer-
riam, 1934, p. 120, [13]). Powerful were grumpy, but not brutal or terrifying. 
Jove associates love and power (Godwin, 1806: p. 197 [14]; Merriam, 1934: p. 
109 [13]), exemplified by rulers adorned with garlands, smiles and jovialness. No 
other power relation has developed such moving imaginary for the human race 
as the one in which people enamored the patriarchal and matriarchal positions 
as god-like authorities. The main achievement of the ancient authority was to 
convey people of their power of creation.   
However, the miranda of power is one of the main instruments not only for 
authorities but also for those who make a claim to power by which the vicious 
nature of a leader’s character and the rise of an authoritarian/totalitarian regime 
move in parallel. Abu Bakr in Saudi Arabia, Yogi Adityanath in India, Talat Pa-
shas in Turkey, Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon, Mao Zedong in China, and Adolf 
Hitler in Germany are among the leaders who used the opportunity of the claims 
of the lower classes for their own transition to power. They aimed to build an 
authoritarian/totalitarian power by using the prevailing autocratic tradition be-
neath the political discourses of their time. Thus, it can be argued that what 
seems to be the worst product of the authoritarian/totalitarian regimes is also the 
“accidental” byproduct, supported by the leaders (Hayek, 1944: p. 135 [11]). 
Authoritarian/totalitarianism regimes can thrive on this phenomenon. 
Lacking in resources is, in fact, unquestionably relying on either force or on 
the miranda of power, and consequently, makes the claim to power autocratic. 
However, autocratic form of power mostly is unaccountable and dangerous for 
the immunity of regime. The solution to this problem was to change the tradi-
tional concept of miranda of power and to move it one step further—authorities 
mixed the beauty of miranda of power—admiration—with the force of religion 
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political thoughts suffered from, the concept of belief in divinity of power.  
Plato discussed the justification of divine law and the authority of philoso-
pher-kings, through a guise of rational principles. However, a direct connection 
between the concepts of divine law and political power were mainly found in the 
medieval era. In this period, a systematic form of justification, based on the 
concept of “belief” began to cause serious theo-political questions on power. In-
quiry started into the concepts of the household and the state, in which claims 
for adoration, obedience, and worship of divinity had once been the famous ap-
proaches for their numinous justification (Sternberger, 1986, p. 23, [15]). In Fa-
rabi’s theory of the state, the theo-political problem centered on the idea that, 
the traditional concept of admiration of power lost its position due to the pre-
vailing concept of religious power. Thus, the traditional concept of admiration 
of power changed to the concept of belief—in divinity of power. In this sense, 
the miranda of power has remained excessively dependent on folks’ belief in the 
“divine law”, which is assumingly sent down by the God. Consequently, they al-
so believed in the “divine power” that can only be exercised by religious men, 
“who [are] not subject to any higher person” (Fakhry, 2002: p. 103 [16]; Mahdi, 
2001: p. 17 [17]). The concept of the miranda of power, which was one of the 
important and traditional instruments used for the justification of authority for 
Plato’s philosopher-kings and Aristotle’s virtuous men, almost lost its role 
through the emergence of religion. The role of religion helps power to justifies 
themselves. Consequently, the credenda of power became a better alternative for 
power holder.  
Having a historical look, we can find the emergence of political religion—the 
emergence of credenda of power—in the medieval age. Farabi, as a political 
theorist, was challenged by the emergence of political Islam (Shokri, 2013: p. 37 
[18]). The new concept of belief—as a prevailing concept of political Islam- had 
changed the political discourse of his time. Farabi found that the credenda of 
power, the concept of religious belief, was one of the main instruments of an 
authority. He understood that since the emergence of political religions, the cre-
denda of power had been the instrument used exclusively by the Proph-
et-lawgiver, religious man (Mahdi, 2001: p. 19 [17]). These authorities were 
represented themselves as divine and privilege by God, despite the fact that they 
were always members of the general public.  
What has always been ignored by regimes, e.g. theocracies, that have relen-
tlessly relied on the credenda of power as their only and most important instru-
ment, is not only the historical process of interaction between folks and power, 
but also the fact that the pragmatic and primary transformation of the miranda 
of power into the credenda power was shaped by the hands of worldly leaders 
whose only concern was authority (Simmons, 2001: p. 27 [19]; Merriam, 1934: p. 
31 [13]; Fu, 1993 [4]). Whether power was bestowed by God or the creation of 
their own imagination, at the end of the day, they were rulers and the rest were 
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the credenda of power is not whether God gave this power to them, but how 
they can maintain the status quo and control over folks. Even in today’s reli-
giously anointed regimes, folks could be asked to obey those in authority and 
may warned to not ask them of anything. 
However, the credenda of power, as an instrument of power does not only 
belong to the politics of medieval Islam—though Islam is hard to be separated 
from political Islam—but also to other civilizations in both the East and the 
West, from the Japanese to the Roman Empire (Simmons, 2001: p. 27 [19]; Bar-
nard, 2001 [20]; Arendt, 1986 [21]; Nye, 2004 [22]). 
In Sociological and Legal Concept of State, Hans Kelsen, a renowned German 
political and legal philosopher argues the emergence of the miranda and cre-
denda of power was in different regimes and in the hand of a long list of various 
personalities. He elaborated that  
the need for adoration, the need to subject oneself to a higher, a holy one, to 
sacrifice oneself, in short all of those human instincts toward self-diminution, 
abnegation and even self-destruction, find their satisfaction in any deifica-
tion of the state, in any fetishism of the state that is pushed beyond ratio-
nality, and whose consequences we can state from close experience. On the 
other hand, there is the will to power of one person who does not content 
himself with a struggle with the victory of a special god on the path to the 
identification of a single individual with his God. For he is content only 
with the victory of his own personality and so, in view of the waning of the 
idea of God, seeks his mask in the state alone (Kelsen, 1928: pp. 249-250 
[23]). 
Seeing this in a specific historical context, there is a brief span between utiliza-
tion of religion in the Christian politics and in Islamic politics. Such utilization 
introduced the credenda of power. Evidence of the use of the credenda of power 
for justification of power in Christian politics may go back to Charles the Great 
(died in 814 AD), a medieval Christian king. In the history of Christian politics, 
the credenda of power in the hands of popes—the heard of medieval catholic 
church—positioned the state as a fortress of religion, and used religion for mass 
control and to justify its own political authority (Lynch and Adamo, 2014 [24]). 
Similarly, in the history of Islamic politics, the credenda of power in the hands of 
Caliphs and other religious men positioned their offices as a fortress of religion 
for mass control and to justify its own political authority. 
The credenda of power plays a strong role in the justification of power based 
on the effectiveness of a religious belief on the people, as the miranda of power is 
based on non-belief form of admiration (Sternberger, 1986: pp. 23-24 [15]). 
Thus, it can be seen that either the miranda or the credenda of power is the in-
strument of power from time to time and from place to place that helps power to 
thrive. 
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political power, i.e. the miranda of power, lost its strength and was manipulated 
by new innovative forms of justification based on the belief of folks (Lynch and 
Adamo, 2014: pp. 65-80 [24]). The waves of politicization and the emergence of 
political religion helped religious men to rise out of traditional hierarchical 
power structures. However, the claim of religious leaders to power was not 
equivalent to the claim of Plato’s philosopher-kings, who had the time and lux-
ury for engaging in philosophical debates, nor was it based on the Aristotle’s ar-
gument on the rational virtues of rulers’ wisdom (Plato, 508-509 [25]). Thus, 
how could both groups, the religious leaders and the philosophers, claim power?  
Farabi interpreted the ancient Greek concept of wisdom, which can be at-
tained through philosophy, as similar to the concept of imitation that can be at-
tained through religion (Fakhry, 2002: p. 106 [16], Mahdi, 2001:p. 17 [17]; Sho-
kri, 2013: p. 39 [18]). The claim of religious men to power relied on divine law 
and “dignity” (Sternberger, 1986: p. 24 [15]) of which law was introduced in re-
ligion and followed by the virtues of imitation. Thus, the theocracies and other 
forms of regimes which excessively rely on the credenda of power set forth the 
frameworks in a shell of a legal order. In Islamic terminology it is called Sharia 
Law (Shokri, 2016 [26]) for people by which they should imitate Caliphsor pops. 
Following, if a Caliph claimed the support of such laws, then the Caliph politi-
cally supported their justification with the credenda of power. He used the reli-
giously anointed laws and orders as an instrument- the credenda of power- to 
shape and to preserve the belief of the folks in a political regime through their 
religion. So far, it is perplexing that Farabi stressed that “religion is an imitation 
of philosophy” (Farabi, p. 44 [27]). This could be a starting point for other re-
search to explore the relationship between the esoteric and exoteric teachings of 
Farabi. In this work, however, we maintain our concern on power and its cha-
racteristics. 
Transitions between authoritarian powers were only possible through a polit-
ical invention which is introduced in the medieval era. The invention was the 
credenda of power. It is an instrument for controlling folks and thereby justify-
ing power (Merriam, 1934: ch.4 [13]). In this sense, we can see that a backward 
transition in argument of time over the power origin in philosophy to power 
origin in religion (Farabi, 1985 [28]; Nasr and Leaman, 1996: p. 190 [29]). We 
can see that Farabi’s virtuous state is based on the assumption that philosophers, 
prophet-lawgivers or virtuous-religious men are the same and wise, yet aim to 
imitate the ideal, while they assume that the rest of people possess only unexa-
mined, common opinions (Farabi, 2010 [27]). Based on this idea, the credenda 
of power was used when the political thinkers tried to justify the connection be-
tween an absolute authority and religiously anointed virtue.  
In all modern theocratic regimes, symbolism in politics is seen as identical and 
important as imitation in religion, and both are critical instruments for creating 
and maintaining unity in a community and controlling folks. This can also be 
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as well as The Perfect State. Symbolism and imitation go hand in hand and are 
among a long list of different elements of the credenda of power. Symbolism and 
imitation, in the religious sense, are vital for producing an image that is similar 
to the concept of knowledge in political philosophy (Farabi, 1985: p. 279 [28]). 
Having said this, symbolism and imitation create a communitarian ideology 
in which “brothers” are made out of folks. In this sense, folks are not just consi-
dered members of a state, but as a result of the instruments of power, they are 
presented as a big family. The concepts of the miranda and credenda of power 
thus produce the concept of nationalism or even the concept of “Bruderschaft” 
(Campagna, 2010: p. 154 [30]), by which the level of their intensity depend on 
the formers. This is how the historical-political process of a society shapes the 
instruments of power. In the case of the credenda of power, which was firstly in-
troduced in the medieval politics and, based on the concept of belief in power, 
compensated the weakness that may be found in the miranda of power. 
Farabi understood the problem of power in his time. He merged the power of 
philosophers and religious men, as if they are the same. They were not the same 
in existence, but from a pragmatic point of view, both used similar instruments 
of political power. So far, it is still unclear if he did this in favor of Plato’s philo-
sopher-king or in favor of religious Imam. Regardless, the attempt to change 
philosophy to religion and to justify a religious hierarchical state (Religiöse-
Herrschaft), may not have been among Farabi’s main political goals, but it could 
not be escaped as a consequence of his ideas. The hierarchical virtuous state, 
which he called as “the perfect state”, was instead a deceptive and authoritarian 
religious state, in which the miranda of power of the philosopher-king trans-
formed to a credenda of power of a prophet-lawgiver or Imam. Yet, Farabi in-
tended to argue for the same nature of power as Plato defended. 
Farabi relentlessly relied on Plato’s idea of the state in Republic by theorizing 
one very similar (Farabi, p. 35 [27]; Campagna, 2010: p. 152 [30]; Hammond, 
1947: p. 52 [31]). Nevertheless, he was certainly aware of the differences between 
his system of thought and that of Plato and Aristotle. At least Farabi’s ideas of 
divine law and position of high intellect were shaped by the social context of 
medieval Islam, and were explicitly influenced by the idea of God’s rule and Is-
lamic theocracy. It is also true that the exact Plato’s ideas of divine law and “the 
ideal state” cannot be found in Farabi’s ideal state. The genius move for Farabi 
was altering the concept of the authoritarian virtuous regime to the authorita-
rian/totalitarian and theocratic one. 
Here, we must ask why Farabi insisted that “the idea of Philosopher, Supreme 
ruler, Prince, Legislature, and Imam is but a single idea”? (Farabi, p. 47, [27]; 
Nasr and Leaman, 1996: p. 190 [29]) Maybe the answer is simple, and easier to 
find that expected: the form of power structure and power relationship that both 
philosopher-king and Imam (religious man or Prophet-lawgiver) require are, in 
fact, alike. All the same, they require different conceptualizations in different 
states. At least, it is clear that there was no fundamental difference in the practice 
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traditional law for justification, they excessively relied on either miranda of 
power or credenda of power. Similarly, the most common, and at the same time 
uncommon point, is the link and the difference between miranda in the ancient 
Greek concept of power, and the credenda of power in the medieval and modern 
concept of power. As for Plato and Farabi, this authoritarian hierarchical power 
structure was perfect and natural (Farabi, 1985: p. 235 [28]), and the miranda 
and credenda of power were also deceptively assumed to be natural.  
2. The Justification of Farabi’s Prophet-Lawgiver: The  
Excessive Reliance on the Credenda of Power 
It has been a long time in the world of politics that religion assesses the justifica-
tion of power. As the result of such interaction, credenda of power became one 
of the main instruments of authorities. 
Farabi stands in the tradition of such transaction between power and religion. 
The Prophet-lawgiver of his time recruits his followers from the mass. They re-
quire no particular hereditary, class, or economic background, but only the reli-
gious knowledge and ability to interpret divine law. As their masculine authority 
relies on the religious law and their interpretation of it, they present a credenda 
of power in which questioning it is regarded as the most serious crime (Plato, 
[32]). The claims to the power of prophet-lawgivers, are not debated, as they are 
already sanctioned by a direct and unimpeachable scale of divinity. Their claim 
to power, which Farabi identified as merely relying on the credenda of power, 
requires there “remains no room for intellect, consideration, deliberation, or ref-
lection with respect to what he says” (Farabi, p. 82 [33]). Farabi saw how ancient 
Greek divine law hid behind the guise of religion, but the hierarchical power 
structure remained the same. Such law has overrun Middle Eastern and African 
countries ever since. Through a close examination, it can be seen that in most 
parts of the Middle Eastern and African states, authorities are not only monopo-
lized by the religious men, but also that the act of questioning their principles 
will be punished by the death penalty. Perhaps, the only way that decadent 
Kingdoms can be replaced as the center of Middle Eastern state authorities is ei-
ther by punishments of death and through revolution. Although the price paid, 
and that is still being paid, for their achievement must still be considered. 
In The Attainment of Happiness, following Plato, Farabi argued that “the 
prince occupies his place by nature” and by his virtues (Fakhry, 2002: pp. 
103-104 [16]), and that this occupation, in fact, surrounded a natural order (Fa-
rabi, p. 34 [27]. Farabi and Plato proposed twin political structures and power 
relations; one lived in ancient Greece and the other in the Islamic Persian king-
dom.  
Moreover, Farabi, just like Aristotle, used the theory of naturalness and the 
comparison of the “head of a household” and the “head of a state” in order to 
bestow the idea of fatherhood onto the  authority of his prophet-lawgiver and 
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Steinschneider, 1966: p. 66 [34]). In this way, he tried to bridge the gap between 
the miranda and the credenda of power. Here, the authority of religious men 
and the authority of his lawgiver were the same through the combination of the 
miranda and the credenda of power so that folks, which he described as “vulgar” 
and “multitude” (Farabi, p. 42 [27]), admired the splendid authority of his 
prophet-lawgiver, or Imam, and that they continuously believed in the natural-
ness and rightfulness of him. In this way, the prophet-lawgiver easily became the 
head of the state with the privilege of controlling individuals. The justification of 
the authority of the Imam is the ability to employ “whoever and whatever” (Fa-
rabi, p. 37 [27] he wants to reach the ultimate end of the state (Farabi, p. 32 
[27]). Farabi explicitly put the rights of prophet-lawgivers and his privilege 
above the rest, as argued that he is the one “who does not need to be ruled by a 
human in anything at all” (Farabi, pp. 78-79 [35]). The traditional admiration of 
folks for authority then turned to be the belief thereof, which was controlled by 
the unquestionable force of divine law. Such an approach to the divine authority 
of a ruler goes beyond written manuscripts and law (Mahdi, 2001: p. 17 [17]). 
Farabi’s approach to the credenda of power of prophet-lawgiver implies the 
same principle of leader with the arbitrary characters found in ancient Greek 
thoughts, who is entitled to control folks, based on his naturally divine superior-
ity (Spearman, 1934: p. 158 [36]). He is not selected by the fact of heredity, or 
because he is Aristotle’s virtuous man, i.e. the rich and white Greek upper class. 
For Farabi’s prophet-lawgiver, neither the indication of capability for high polit-
ical office of state, nor the proof of traditional or biological descent is the deci-
sive criterion for the justification of his claim. Farabi’s prophet-lawgiver is eligi-
ble to claim power and to deny the rights of others based on the arbitrary cha-
racter of his divinity and his art of kingship. Yet, this acts as a privilege for con-
trolling the rest is assumed to be “equipped for them by nature: that is in those 
who possess superior natures with very great potentialities” (Farabi, p. 34 [27]). 
The justification is not limited to the legality of a system or the rationalization of 
norms and values. The credenda of power works all the way to justify the power 
of the prophet-lawgiver. Even so, it makes the prophet-lawgiver an eligible 
competitor in the on-going miranda of power. This is seen in history through 
how the credenda of power of Prophet-lawgivers make their way to the high of-
fice of a political structure, despite the high cost for folks and the community. 
This emergence of authority, which merely relies on the credenda of power, is 
not based on the rational-normative principles of folks, or deliberative participa-
tion, as Aristotle partially implies, but merely on the concept of belief—the belief 
of folks in the infallible power of their rulers. 
Though The right divine of kings to govern wrong [ly] (Hone, 1821 [37]) is an 
unusual statement today, at least its sophisticated and aristocratic defenders do 
not deny that kings, philosopher-kings, and virtuous men could govern wrongly. 
This appears more in Aristotle’s Politics—that such fault is the sin and immoral-
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doctrine of Divine Right far more uncritically than Filmer and Hone. The cha-
racter of credenda of power requires that the divine or religious law be infallible; 
their rulers, , e.g. Caliph or any other kind of ruler, dedicated People, cannot do 
wrong, morally or intellectually (Jouvenel, 1948: p. xvii [38]). 
Farabi’s prophet-lawgiver, also take a point from the authoritarian/totalitarian 
role of the philosopher-king and Aristotle’s mixed government, in the potential 
of mastering the people, who laid down his theory behind the lightning picture 
of divinity. Farabi’s ruler avoids the implication of rational dicta, while simulta-
neously and discreetly avoids rationalizing his credenda of power. Therefore, the 
firm and rationalized authoritarian/totalitarian structure of power are similar as 
in Farabi’s political thoughts, in which the prophet-lawgiver occupies the highest 
office of the state (Farabi, 1985: p. 277 [28]; Farabi, 1961: pp. 37-38 [39]); and 
individual rights are denied not by the hands of prophet-lawgiver, but by the 
command of the infallible divine law (“<Faith> schütz unfehlbar gegen 
Schnupfen.” Weber and Winckelmann, 1969: p. 299 [40]). The credenda of 
power sells a brand of morality where the moral norms are the first victims of 
ignorance of political consciousness. The closest example of such an idea is au-
thoritarian/totalitarian Islamic Caliphates in both the Medieval and modern pe-
riods and under the various form of regimes (Shokri, 2016 [26]). 
However, the same historic experience raises further critiques of the validity 
or the credentials of prophet-lawgivers. Among these critiques are: How can one 
practice critique on a true prophet-lawgiver and distinguish them from those 
who are fraudulent? (Nasr and Leaman, 1996, p. 190, [29]) How can we detect 
the negative political consciousness and apocryphal character of religious per-
sonalities that shape beliefs of people? (Weber, 1969, [40]). 
Here, we discuss the penetralia of power, in which no one has mapped and 
few have ever attempted to explore. It is neither attempt of this work to present a 
critique of religious laws. The aim is to assess the concepts of the miranda and 
credenda of power in relation to authority and political rights. In this sense, to 
get back to the original arguments on these instruments of power, we see how 
Farabi’s proposal for the ideal power structure and his concept of the proph-
et-lawgiver share similarities with the authoritarian/totalitarian power structures 
of Plato and Aristotle (Mayer, 1950: p. 392 [41]). We look at how these two 
views attempt to justify power by using the miranda and credenda of power, and 
why, in practice, many have failed to justify it through an argument based on 
political conscious theory. 
Among Farabi’s various pieces of political writing, he focused on the Attain-
ment of Happiness and On The Perfect State (Rislahfi Ara’ ahl al-Madnah 
al-Fadila or Mabādi’ Arā’ Ahl al-Madina al-fāżela), and discussed ideas of justi-
fication of (or criteria for) power, and the justification of hierarchical virtuous 
state. However, a slightly different idea from Farabi is his work called The 
Aphorisms of the Statesman (Farabi, 1961: pp. 37-38 [39]). 
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matter is because that he was a political philosopher who stood between two 
worlds. Though the connection that Farabi felt, and the influence he gained, 
from the ancient Greek philosophers, one cannot ignore the historical and re-
gional differences from which these men came from. To this extent, another 
study would be required to examine whether Farabi esoterically tried to increase 
the qualitative criteria on which a religious ruler should rely for the sake of his 
ideal philosopher-king, or in order to secure the place of religious rulers in the 
Islamic power structures. This is, unfortunately, not the main purpose of this 
small work. Whatever the answer to this question, it does not affect our assess-
ment of the power structure that Farabi praised. Whether or not he succumbed 
to the influence of his time and to the regime he served, any argument about 
power structures in which the rulers and their authority are justified by divine or 
religious law leaves no question that these regimes rely heavily on the credenda 
of power (Farabi, 2011 [42]). 
In summary, analysis of both medieval and modern hierarchical power rela-
tions must attentively consider the credenda of power. The power of those who 
try to justify themselves as authoritarian/totalitarian prophet-lawgivers, merely 
hinges on the concept of the credenda.   
For Farabi, the theo-political problem begins when the credenda of power, as 
one of the instruments of power utilized by the religious rulers comes to light. 
Farabi knew that the erosion of the credenda of power is inevitable due to the 
“translation movement” and the increasing influence of Greek political works in 
the medieval Islamic world.  
In On Political Government and Aphorisms of the Statesman Farabi tried 
to address this theo-political problem. In his attempt to escape from the 
theo-political problem of his time and the erosion of the credenda of power, Fa-
rabi distanced his prophet-lawgiver, from a purely religious picture. Instead he 
was described as using certain personal categories. In part 29 of the Aphorisms 
of the Statesman, the manifestation of virtuous men is clear in which Farabi’s 
ruler (in line with Aristotle) was adorned with virtues (Desmond, 2011: p. 158 
[43]) and art Farabi, 1961: p. 106 [39]). In fact, Farabi used the Platonic political 
structure of the ideal state and the logic of Aristotle’s virtues politics, and argued 
that the science of religious law and theology (figh) are ancillary to the science of 
politics in order to make a strong credenda for authority, and religious men may 
be virtuous men, at the same time as lawmakers and kings.  
Though the characters and elements of power may differ when we compare 
the matter of justification in Farabi’s political theory, it is more important to 
look at the power relationships and the power structure. Looking at a bigger 
picture, we realize that not only the nature of power but the way power practices 
authority remains the same in both ancient Greek political theory and in that of 
Farabi. Philosopher-kings, virtuous men, and Imam are regarded as the head of 
the state. The nature of their power and the political offices that they hold are 
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(Desmond, 2011: p. 158 [43]). Both Plato’s philosopher-king and Farabi’s Imam 
based their claims to power on the “naturalness” theory of state, and conse-
quently, their natural privilege in the power structure.  
The common point between Plato, Aristotle, and Farabi is the core essence of 
their arguments. Their arguments centered on what a state requires as a natural 
hierarchical power structure. What changed in medieval political theories from 
those in ancient Greece was the transformation of the miranda of power to the 
credenda of power. The excessive use of the instruments of power in Farabi’s 
model of the state is as same as the ancient Greek model of hierarchical authori-
tarian/totalitarian state. However, the admiration of power changed into an ex-
cessive belief in political theology, revelation, faith, or all together: the credenda 
of power (Farabi, 1985: p. 279 [28]). 
Nonetheless, after the establishment of an authoritarian/totalitarian regime 
that merely relies on the credenda of power, the system begins to introduce new 
virtues. Since most of the time the credenda of power manifested in the figures 
and personalities, the level of acceptance of virtues promoted by the credenda of 
power merely depends on the level of the manipulation of the rulers and the 
personalities based on the assumed virtues—al-madina al—fadila and tehsil 
al-sa’ada. This is why personality cults are the hallmark—and primarily a con-
sequence rather than the cause—of established autocracy. 
In this sense, we can argue that the manipulation of the rulers whose rely on 
the credenda is the same characteristic which Farabi argued for. He named two 
admirable traits for wielding such power: persuasion and compulsion (Farabi, p. 
36 [27]). Thus, where the divinity of divine law supports persuasion, the justified 
authority supports compulsion. Moreover, there was the assumption that the 
responsibility of the prophet-lawgivers, is secured through the presumed con-
nection to God (Desmond, 2011: p. 158 [43]). Folks felt a divine responsibility, 
which reached its maximum at this time when religious rulers decisively 
represented the almighty. The traditional inner and external compositions of 
beauty and force added up to belief to form the credenda of power. Though this 
instrument of power helps its justification, an excessive reliance on it prevented 
a community from moving further toward critical thinking. Hitherto, Farabi’s 
method of justifying the power of Imam, which is maintained in today’s modern 
theocracies, stuck strongly to the credenda of power. The mere reliance on the 
credenda of power by the rulers of Farabi’s virtuous state or any authorita-
rian/totalitarian power is evidence that they do not appreciate any concept of 
political consciousness.  
In sum, in Farabi’s works, the doctrine of the virtuous state is placed at least 
one level below the theory of the authority of the prophet-lawgiver, Imam, or 
king, whose power is religious and fraternal. It may be assumed that the religious 
leader, who appears in the figure of the prophet-lawgiver or Imam, is in a sense 
more virtuous than those justified to be in power by the ancient Greeks. This 
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rules, but also on the normative extension of the religious rules. However, even if 
such assertion is a considerable one, it leaves us to wonder whether this divine 
criterion also forces the authority to act in the same line of moral principles. 
Second, we can see that this special form of the hierarchical structures has always 
used the virtues and massive propaganda to build a trench against repudiations 
and critiques. Islamic regimes, even in Farabi’s age, tried hard to change the li-
terature, culture, symbols, and history that were used in previous or co-existing 
political systems; different laws, historical approaches, stories, textbooks, propa-
ganda were used in the same manner. Therefore, the nature of different religious 
regimes means that each has opposite principles, of which they see their own as 
virtuous and the others as vice.  
Let us look at the bigger picture. In French Revolution, there was a deter-
mined effort to change the French dialect, which was established by former, an-
cient regimes (Gentile, 2006: p. 9 [44]). After the Turkish War of Independence 
in 1923, there were successful reforms in every aspect of social affairs (Saikal and 
Schnabel, 2003 [45]; Lewis, 1999: p. 66 [46]). What we learn from these examples 
is one simple but vital principle: there is a nuanced difference between the justi-
fiable claim to power and unjustifiable claim. Justifiable claims may be based on 
the credenda of power, such as in Turkey’s experience of modernization, but 
unjustifiable claims mostly and excessively relied on the credenda of power.  
Thus, when the power of a regime is analyzed, one element to be considered is 
to what extent it relies on the credenda of power. There are many historical ex-
amples of transitions to different political power structures, whether in Farabi’s 
age, in which states shifted into Islamic form of power, or in contemporary 
times, when China and Russia became capitalist economy yet are quasi com-
munist regimes (Harper, 1929: pp. 956-971 [47], and recently, in the Middle 
Eastern countries, which are transforming into different forms of autocracies. 
However, one common point between all of these regimes is their excessive re-
liance on their miranda and the credenda of power. 
3. The Justifiable and Unjustifiable Credenda of Power 
Although the credenda of power and charismatic leaders are effective tools for 
creating and maintaining a harmonized state, they can also be used for justifying 
authority and thus increasing power. This list of leaders is by no means limited 
to the old or new aristocracies and theocracies; democratic power structures and 
Solomon-like institutions also come to force and add to the meaning of govern-
mental miranda and credenda. The Lincolns, Churchills, Mazzinis, Anthonys, 
Gandhis, Roosevelts, and a long list of others, have enhanced the prestige of 
power (Merriam, 1934: p. 111 [13]). This is important, as the pure credenda of 
power on its own is not democratically praiseworthy because it produces nega-
tive political consciousness (Merriam, 1934: ch.4 [13]; Arendt, 1948 [48]). 
Hitherto, the justification of credenda of power was directly related to the jus-
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of power per se can also be assessed theologically. One important determining 
factor of whether the development of the credenda of power is justifiable or not, 
is that it is possible to distinguish the purpose for which means are employed. 
The second determining point is whether the credenda of power can be assessed 
with rational normative principles. An unjustified credenda of power is pro-
duced and defended merely by itself. These two important points are seen in 
various forms and under the different circumstances in the hierarchical authori-
tarian/totalitarian power structures of autocracies, theocracies and communists 
regimes. From time to time, autocrats, theocrats, and communists have pro-
posed not only to destroy previous credenda of power structures, but also to de-
stroy the identity of individuals or personalities who helped shape the previous 
credenda of power or those personalities who oppose the new one. Moreover, 
autocrats, theocrats and communists, in one way or another, do not tolerate 
freedom of speech, individualistic religion, private property and capitalism, as 
they must repress these concepts in order to build their own (unjustified) cre-
denda of power, as their only instrument of authority (Sternberger, 1986 [15]). 
4. Conclusions 
This paper assessed two polygons of power or two instruments of power, as they 
originated and were practiced in different regimes, in ancient Greece, as well as 
by medieval and modern authorities. Both the miranda and credenda of power 
are instruments that can be used to assess the claims to the justification of pow-
er. In other words, these two instruments of power can be used excessively by hie-
rarchical or authoritarian/totalitarian power structures, such as semi-democracies, 
fascist states, theocracies, and communist regimes for their justification.  
In the history of traditional thoughts, Plato and Aristotle elaborated on the 
systematic interaction between the miranda of power and the hierarchical re-
gimes in their political works. However, Farabi later developed a unique theory 
of justification that built—instead of miranda of power—on the credenda of po-
litical power, since he found that if power is based on an individual’s leadership, 
then the miranda of power as the only instrument of authority of personality- 
whether they are a king or a philosopher-king—is not adequate enough for justi-
fication of power. Indeed, Islam as a political religion challenged the traditional 
miranda of power as well as the modern ones. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in 
Iran and emergence of Islamic political parties and movements after the Arab 
Spring in the Middle East are the example of the transformation of the miranda 
to the credenda of power.  
The miranda of power may be critical for justifying an authority’s claim to 
power, but it lacks the fraternity, obedience, and unity of a political community. 
With the emergence of divine claims to power, political theorists began to notice 
that admiration, —that is the miranda of power—was neither general nor natu-
ral, and that it was the opinion of a certain class and a product of meticulous 
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the age of Farabi show that if authorities use a combination of admiration and 
belief from the public, —in other words the credenda of power, then it appears 
as if the folks justified the power themselves. For the credenda of power requires 
that folks be self-generators of the belief in power. Because when an idea turns 
into common religious belief, which is sanctioned by leviathans, gods, and di-
vine beings, no one can question it without the expectation of a militant reaction 
of believers.  
Whether the credenda of power are used for good or bad depends on the 
power and the nature of the authority. For instance, in the United States of 
America, voting for a presidential candidate or voting on a civil act, religion, and 
specifically Christianity, has always played an important role. One of the impor-
tant arguments used against the slavery, for example, was that “it is a sin” 
(Danver, 2011: p. 425 [49]). Similarly, we see that the modern theocracies also 
rely on the credenda of power. However, an excessive reliance of these power 
structures on the credenda of power may possibly result in oppression and mo-
nopolization of power. As a result, an authority denies the essential dignity of 
human nature, for the sake of a far-off natural theological community that con-
trols the strong impression of divine religious law. Thus, contrary and paradox 
results are possible by using the credenda of power for justification of power? 
Looking at the specific instruments of power invites us to focus on the process 
of the politicization of folks. The more critical analysis there is of the instru-
ments of power, the better understanding there may be of their causes and ef-
fects in the political arena. So, we argue that the Hitler’s seizure of power and the 
long list of similar cases of power transition, namely Mussolini’s fascist uprising 
and Mao’s revolutionary achievement, are not merely legal walk overs (Hafez, 
2010: p. 117 [50]). We also conclude that political uprisings in the recent years 
after the Arab Spring of 2011 in the Middle East are not the result of the process 
of politicization of society. However, the spirit of communities, along with an 
extreme way to interpret the constitution produce the opportunity for the cre-
denda of power to work with other instruments of power to support stronger 
authoritarian/totalitarian regimes in which manipulation in all strata of the so-
cio-political lives of individuals are assumed to be justified. 
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